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Everyone knows that employees with more years of service at a company
normally receive higher pay than comparable employees who have spent less time
with the same firm.' Within the economics profession, the conventional wisdom
of the 1960s and 1970s has been that the observed higher relative earnings of
employees with longer service reflect greater accumulation of human capital
through on—the—job training and thus higher relative productivity.2 There
are, however, numerous other plausible explanations for the higher relative
earnings of employees with longer service in which relative productivity plays
a much less significant role. For instance, Jacob Mincer recognized the
possibility that the positive association between job tenure and earnings
might only "reflect the prevalence of institutional arrangements such as
seniority provisions in employment practices." He then implicitly describes
one approach to testing the human capital belief: "Such practices, however,
do not contradict the productivity—augmenting hypothesis, unless it can be
shown that growth of earnings under seniority provisions is largely
independent of productivity growth."3
Although the test required to establish empirically that the human
capital explanation of the company service—earnings profile is superior to
alternaUve .iodels in which other factors determine earnings growth seems
straightforward,there is no evidence demonstrating that tenure—earnings
differentials canin fact be explained by tenure—productivity differentials.
As a result, important beliefs about earnings differentials and related
labor market phenomena have been held without any apparent empirical foundation.2
Our work on the operation of enterprise internal labor markets has
produced very strong evidence that at least the within—grade or within—job
fraction of the observed return to years of company service (40 to 80 percent
of the total return to company service in the settings for which we have seen
data) cannot be explained on the basis of an underlying relationship between
service and productivity. Furthermore, we have collected survey data which
imply that years of service play a significant role in promotion decisions for
a very large fraction of our country's workforce; for those employees, the
cross—grade or cross—job earnings differential associated with service must
also be considered at least in part a return to service per se.It would thus
appear that junior workers are typically paid less, and senior workers more,
than the value of their marginal product. One might expect this sort of
deferred compensation scheme to be accompanied by constraints on firms'
ability to cheat workers out of the return promised for the "second half" of
their work lives; we hae gathered evidence that senior employees at most U.S.
firms do in fact enjoy substantial protection against being involuntarily
terminated. Our results raise the intriguing question of why senior workers
receive higher earnings than their junior peers, even though they are no more
productive.
The remainder of this paper discusses how the facts just stated were
discovered and the necessity for the collection of additional facts if we are
to hold empirically—based beliefs about why service per se plays such an
important role in private sector U.S. enterprises.3
The Facts on Service—Earnings Differentials
Within Grades or Jobs
To determine whether service—earnings differentials can be explained by
service—productivity differentials, it is necessary to search for measures of
individuals' relative contributions to their firms. We looked first at the
computerized personnel files for exempt (roughly, managerial and professional)
employees of four major U.S. corporations; each file had information on
individuals' job performance, company service, and earnings. At three of
these companies the performance ratings were done by the employee's immediate
supervisor; at the fourth, in addition to the immediate supervisor's rating,
there was a ranking of each employee relative to others in an appropriate
comparison group. Later, }Ialasz gained access to a comparable data set for a
sample of nonexempt salaried employees.4
Under all of the companies' evaluation procedures, supervisors are
instructed to base their rating or ranking on how well an individual, in the
year of evaluation, is carrying out the responsibilities of his orher job.
Thus, a performance review should reflect an employee's current level of
performance relative to the level of performance deemed normal for someone in
his or her position. It follows that the relative contributions of employees
can be assessed from their performance ratings only if the employees hold
similar jobs.
For compensation purposes, most companies assess the relative importance
and difficulty of their myriad exempt and nonexempt salaried positions and
group them into grade levels. Thus, it seems reasonable to assumethat within
a grade level, a higher performance rating implies higher productivity. It is
for this reason that we, and }Lalasz, were forced to look within grades in4
doing our analysis of the determinants of service—earnings differentials.
Fortunately, however, the portion of the total return to years of service
occurring within grade was between 40 and 50 percent of the total differential
for our four samples of white, male, exempt employees and 50percent for
Halasz's sample of nonexempt salaried employees.
The key finding of these analyses was that none of thesubstantial,
within—grade, service—earnings differentials could be explained bya within—
grade, service—performance differential. Contrary to what would beexpected
under the on—the—job training model, while greater service movedemployees
toward the upper tail of the earnings distribution for theirgrade level, it
did not move them toward the upper tail of the relevant performance
distribution. Once employees are assigned to grades, thesalary advantage
that accrues with company service appears to beautomatic, and hence,
independent of productivity.
This result has been challenged on two grounds. First, it hasbeen
charged that the estimated service—performance differential is biased downward
since a negative partial correlation betweenyears of service and unobserved
quality was induced by the necessity of looking only within grade levels.
(This bias would be brought about by a promotion system under which meritat
least sometimes prevails over seniority, so that longer servicewithin grade
implies more times passed over for promotions.) Second, it has been claimed
that performance ratings, even for samples of white males,are not valid
indicators of relative productivity.
There likely is a negative within—grade correlation betweenservice and
ability (largest in absolute value for exempt employees and smallest in5
absolute value for unionized hourly workers), so that the estimated within—
grade effect of service on performance is probably biased downward. It must
be remembered, however, that the estimated within—grade effect of service on
earnings is biased downward in the same way. The goal of the analyses of
employees' positions in the relevant performance and salary distributions was
not to derive consistent estimates of the effect of service on either
performance or salary. Rather, they were intended to yield an answer to the
question: Can performance explain the substantial within—grade earnings
advantage enjoyed by longer—service salaried employees at the firms we have
studied? Our answer of 'no" does not depend on the consistency of the
estimate of the impact of service on performance or on earnings. All that the
response depends on is that the difference between these two estimated service
effects (which have been made comparable through the construction of the
performance and earnings categories used in the models estimated) be a
consistent estimate of ihe difference between the two "true" service effects.
We know of no reason why it should not be.
In our previously cited articles on the issue at hand, we go to great
lengths to address the most likely criticisms of subjective performance
ratings. In light of what we have been able to learn from our review of the
relevant personnel literature, from the case studies we have done, and from
various analyses with company personnel data, we feel very comfortable
assuming that performance ratings are good indicators of employees' relative
productivity in the year of evaluation. The diverse evidence we have seen
seems to support strongly the interpretation that we have given to our results6
concerning the ability of rated performance to explain the within—grade return
to years of service.
Further support for our conclusion regarding within—grade service—
earnings differentials can be derived from a recent econometric case study
done by Yanker in which an "objective" productivity measure is used to conduct
an analysis like those just discussed.5Yanker examined
productivity and earnings data for approximately 400 blue collar employees at
a unionized manufacturing plant. The productivity measure used was equal to
the time a worker took to do his or her job divided by the standard time for
performing the job. The study found that none of the within—job service—
earnings differential (80 percent of the total service—earnings differential)
could be explained on the basis of more senior workers having higher
productivity.
An appendix to this paper summarizes the studies just mentioned, plus
twenty—one other studies relating some index of productive value to tenure or
age in various settings.These analyses examined employees within disparate
occupations: production workers (in the wooden household furniture, footwear,
and apparel industries); scientists; engineers; teachers; mail sorters; and
office workers. Fourteen of these additional studies used objective measures
of productive value including: furniture, shoes, or apparel produced;
publications; patents; students' standardized test scores; mail sorted; pages
typed; items filed; or cards punched. This research provides support for the
proposition that, beyond a typically short orientation period, those who have
greater than average service typically perform no better or less well than
those with similar assignments who have less than average service. When7
considered together withtheevidence from various sources that wages have a
strong positive relationship with tenure within occupational group,these
investigations strongly imply that more (less) senior employees are generally
paid uiore (less) than the value of their marginal product.Extant evidence on
service—productivity differentials seems to have the same implication about
the role of productivity in explaining within—grade or within—job service—
earnings differentials whether the index of relative productivevalue is based
on an •'objective" measure or on a subjective" performance rating.
The Facts on the Role of Service per se
in Promotion Decisions
To determine whether the 20 to 60 percent of the monetary return to years
of company service that occurs across grades can be explained in terms of a
service—productivity differential, it is necessary to understand the roleof
service independent of productivity in promotion decisions. To take a step in
this direction, we surveyed a randomly selected sample of 1,025 Standard and
Poor's companies about, among other things, the conditions under which a
junior employee would be promoted ahead of a senior coworkerswho was not as
good a performer.6 The question asked was:
In actual practice, are junior employees prornted
instead of more senior employees who want the job?
() Yes,if it is believed that the junior employee will do better than
the senior employee on the next job or on later jobs.
() Yes,if it is believed that the junior employee viii do significantly
better thanthesenior employee on the next job or on later jobs.
()No,never.8
The responses to this query are summarized in Table 1.They indicate that T6
percent of private sector, nonagricultural, nonconstruction, unionizedhourly
employees work in settings where senior employees are favoredsubstantially
vhen promotion decisions are made; for nonunionhourly employees, the
comparable estimate is 56 percent; for non—exempt salaried employees, 50
percent; and for exempt salaried employees, 48percent.Overall, we estimate
that perhaps 60percentof our country's private sector, nonagriculcural,
rionconstruction employees work in settings where senior employeesare favored
substantially in the promotion process.7 Hence, for this largepart of the
U.S. workforce, it appears that the piece of the totalmonetary return to
seniority that can be linked to senior employees who have been promoted to
better—paying jobs than are held by otherwise comparable junior employees is
to a significant extent a reward to seniorityper se, rather than simply a
reward for higher productivity. Moreover, it should be notedthat the 60
percent figure estimates the fraction of the private sector,nonagricultural,
nonconstruction workforce employed where senior employees seem to be favored
substantially in promotion choices; the percentage working where senior
employees are favored at all is likely to be much greater. This is because in
many settings senior employees can be expected to have a significantly higher
probability of being promoted than their junior colleagues when the
comparisons are limited to those with the same productivity.
Hence, it appears that only just over a third of private sector
nonagricultural, nonconstructjon employment in the United States is found in
aettings where the sole monetary return to seniority per se isthesubstantial





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































appears to be found where the earnings advantage associatedwith seniority
independent of productivity occurs both as a result of the assignments given
to employees and as a result of the way they are paid for doing a given task.
The Facts on the Role of Service per se
in Termination Decisions
We would expect that the compensation scheme found at most U.S.
workplaces would go hand—in--hand with a provision designed to protectworkers
from being cheated Out of the return promised for the "second half" of their
work lives. To determine the extent to which protection of this nature
conditioned firms' decision making about which employees to terminate when
some could not be retained, we also asked the folloving questionof our
randomly selected samp:'.e offirms:8
Inthe event of a workforce reduction, are senior employees
permanently laid off in place of junior employees?
()Yes,if it is believed that the junior employee will be
worth more on net to the company than the senior
employee.
() Yes,if it is believed that the junior employee will be
worth significantly more on net to the company than the
senior employee.
No, never. ()
Theexpression "worth more on net" was used to mean "worth more consider-
ing both performance and earnings, today and in thefuture." The "signifi
cantly more on net' and the "no, never" responses are thus consistentwith the
statement that the firm can be expected to incur significant short—run costs
to protect its senior workers' earnings claims.
The answers from the survey respondents who had witnessed involuntary
terminations are summarized in Table 2. They indicate that approximatelY85



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































work in settings where senior employees do in fact enjoy substantially greater
protection against job loss than junior employees doing similar work.9
Importantly, there appear to be substantial differences between union and
nonunion settings in this regard. Rules protecting senior workers against
being permanently laid off before their junior coworkers appear to be both more
prevalent and stronger under trade unions. For hourly employees, almost 100
percent of the responses pertaining to groups covered by collective bargaining
implied that seniority in and of itself receives substantial weight in
termination decisions, while only 85 percent of the responses pertaining to
noncovered groups indicated that this is the case. As for "strength," while
84 percent of our survey responses that pertained to unionized hourly
employees indicated that a senior worker would never be involuntarily
terminated before a junior worker, the same was true for only 42 percent of
the responses pertaining to nonunion hourly employees.
The Facts to Be Collected
An explanation of why senior workers doing a given job iflU.S.corpora
tions receive higher salaries than their junior, but no less valuable,
coworkers remains to be documented. At present, there are a number of
theories that might be considered consistent with our findings. One group of
potertial explanations revolves around the notion that employers and employees
may enter Into Implicit contracts that provide that earnings be deferred
toward the end of the worklife. Firms may offer such contracts: (1) to deter
quits or behavior that would lead to discharge;10 (2) to discourage workers
with high propensities to quit from seeking employment with the firm;11(3)to13
improve morale by giving employees regular raises,and (4) to insure
relatively risk—averse employees against slow earningsgrowth that might
otherwise be associated with slow productivitygrowth.12 A second type of
explanation might be that such contracts avoidthe unpleasantness felt by a
supervisor who has to fire or reduce therelative salary of a long—time
subordinate. A third issue that deserves mention isthat societal beliefs ——
forexample, the idea that elders should be respected——maycondition
employeest beliefs concerning "just" relative compensation.
Unfortunately, at this point, all of these theoriessuffer the same
deficiency as the human capital theory aboutthe service—earnings profile:
absence of an empirical basis. More facts concerningenterprise internal
labor markets must be forthcoming if we are todo more than guess about why
service independent of productivity is rewarded so highlyin the pricing and
allocation of labor. We must remember that statementswith no factual basis
are conjectures, no matter how empirical they maysound. Empiricism requires
data.14
FOOTNOTES
1Weshould emphasize that all the discussion aridevidencepresented in
thispaper refers to enterprise internal labor markets; Doeringer arniPiore
(1971), PP. 2—4, explores the distinction between enterprise and craft internal
lchor markets.
2Thehuman capital model of investment inon—the—job training is laid out inBecker (1964), pp. 13—37.
3Rincer (1974),p. 12. Mincer has seniority provisions under collective
bargaining agreements in mind when he makes this statement, but his logic
applies equally well in other institutional settings.
4See Medoff (1977), Medoff andAbraham (1980, 1981), and Ralasz (1980).
5See Yanker (1980).
6See Abraham and Medoff (1982a) for a fuller discussion of thesesurvey
results.
7This very rough estimate was obtained by weighting the estimates for
union hourly employees, nonunion hourly employees and salaried employees by
the fractions of private sector, nonagricultural, nonconstruction employment
in each of these same three groups. The employment figures were derived from
the May 1978 Current Population Survey (CPS): union members paid by the hour,
17 percent; nonmembers paid by the hour, 43 percent; and nonhourly employees,
40 percent, of which 8 percent were union and 92 percent were nonunion. There
was no way to distinguish noriexempt and exempt salaried employment on the CPS.
8See Abraham and Medoff (1982b) for a fuller discussion of thesesurvey
results.
This very rough estimate was derived using the approach described in
footnote 7.
10For development of a model along these lines,see Becker and Stigler
(1974) and Lazear (1979).
See Salop and Salop (1976) and Viscusi(1978).
12Models with much this flavor have been developed by Harris and
Holmstrom (1981) and loannides and Pissarides (1982).15
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Performance ratings for approximately 200 persons hired over a
six year period were used in the analysis. Other factorsthe
same, years in supervisory positionhad a positive effect on
rated performance. However, the mean amount of companyservice
among those in the sample was only three years.
Data on salary, performance rating assigned by supervisor, job
grade level and individual characteristicsfor approximately
8,000 white male employees at a large company weretaken from
that company's computerized personnel file. Approximately
40 percent of the higher earnings associated with seniority
took the form of higher earnings within grade level.While
additional company service beyond the mean amount increased
the probability of being towards the top of the within-grade-
level salary distribution, it decreased the probabilityof being
towards the top of the within—grade—level performance distri-
bution. In addition, analysis of longitudinal data on payand
performance revealed that, for those stayingin the same job
grade level over time, relative within—grade—level salaryrose
but relative within—grade—level rated performance fell.
Salary, performance rating, job grade leveland infornation on
individual characteristics were taken from approximately300
non—exempt employees' personnel records. Forthese employees,
approximately 50 percent of the return to senioritytook the
form of higher earnings within grade level. Additional
company service beyond the mean amountincreased the proba-
bility of being towards the top of the within—grade—level
salary distribution but decreased the probabilityof being
towards the top of the within—grade—level performancedistri-
bution.
Cross—sectional results virtually identical to those reported
in Medoff and Abraham (1981) were obtained with datafor
several thousand white male employees at each of two large
manufacturing firms.A2
SUMMARYOFSTUDIES PERTAINING TO THERELATIONSHIPOF TENURE,
EXPERIENCE AND AGE TO PRODUCTIVITY a
(continued)
Subject Group Methodology and Conclusions
and Study
Blue collar Data on hourly rate of pay, productivity, job grade level and
employees at a individual characteristics for approximately 400 workers were
unionized taken from their personnel records. The productivity measure
manufacturing plant was equal to the time the worker took to do his/her job divided
(Yanker [1980]). by the standard time for performing the job. Approximately
80 percent of the earnings return to seniority occurred within
job grade level; none of this within—grade--level return could
be explained on the basis of more senior workers having higher
productivity.
Scientists Cross—sectional data for a random sample of U.S. scientists
(Cole [19781). in six disciplines showed a peak among those aged 40 to 44
both in mean number of papers published and in the importance
of published works as measured by number of citations. How-
ever, all differences in mean output between adjacent age
groups were very small. Longitudinal data for the cohort
of U.S. mathematicians who got their Ph.D.'s between 1947
and 1950 showed no relationship between time since receiving
Ph.D. and either number of publications or number of citations
to those publications.
Airline Cross—sectional results very similar to those in Medoff and
managers Abraham (1981) were obtained using data for approximately
(Medoff [1977]). 800 managers employed by an airline.
Sixth grade The change between third grade and sixth grade in individual
teachers students' composite achievement score on the Iowa Test of
(Summers and Basic Skills was used as a measure of educational output.
Wolfe [1977]). Sixth grade teachers' experience was measured in years, up to
11 years. A total of 627 usable observations were obtained.
Controlling for other factors, students whose third—grade
scores were above the norm benefited from additional sixth--
grade teacher experience, but among those with third—grade
scores below the norm, additional teacher experience was
associated with smaller changes in test score.
Scientists and Performance data was collected for 290 researchers in 22
engineers (Hall research and development organizations using questionnaires
and Mansfield which asked people to rate their own performance relative to
11975]). othersin similar positions by placing themselves on a 7—point
(continued)A3
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(continued)
Subject Group Methodology and Conclusions
and Study
scale ranging from "in top 5%" to "in the lower 25%". The same
questionnaire was readininistered to 90 of the researchers two
years later. Cross—sectional analyses of the two sets of
responses found self—rated performance to be uncorrelated with
seniority.
Inner—city third Progress made during third grade in math and in reading by each
grade teachers of approximately 900 black students was measured using changes
(Murnane [1975]). in the students' standard scores on Metropolitan Achievement
Tests. Controlling for other factors, the biggest improvement
in students' test scores was observed for teachers with three
to four years of experience. Teachers with five or more years
of experience were found to be no more effective or less
effective than teachers with three or four years of experience.
Engineers in Three measures of performance were collected for approximately
technology—based 2,500 design and development engineers at six companies:(1)
commercial performance ratings done by management; (2) management evalua—
industries (Dalton tions of the complexity of engineers' assignments; and (3)
and Thompson [1971]).engineers' own assessments of what happens to the productivity
of those doing technical work as they age. Rated performance
was highest for those aged 31 to 35 and fell sharply there-
after. Those 26 to 30 performed the most complex tasks, with
older engineers doing much less complex work. The engineers
themselves said peak productivity for those doing technical
work occurred at age 38. However, salaries were substantially
higher for those in each successive age bracket through the
41 to 45 year-old group and were level beyond age 45.
3econd and Cross—sectional data from a survey covering 1,061 third—grade
third grade students in a large California school system was used. Indi—
teachers vidual students' third grade Stanford Achievement test scores
(Hanushek were used as a measure of educational output, Controlling
[1970]) for students' first grade test scores and other relevant
factors, neither second grade teachers' experience nor third
grade teachers' experience was found to have any significant
effect on third grade test score.A4
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Data was collected on 113 male production managers in one divi-
sion of a rocket engine development and manufacturing concern.
The study focused on how well various tests of leadership
potential predict managerial success, but included a corre-
lation analysis of seniority versus performance. Two measures
of performance were used:(1) immediate supervisors were
asked to check descriptive statements about each manager and
integral weights from 0 to 4 were applied in scoring the
checklists; and (2) the company's labor relations staff rated
the manager's handling of employee relations matters on a
7—interval scale. For the 86 subjects for whom both per-
formance measures were available, seniority was not found to
be significantly correlated with either rating.
Longitudinal data on average number of papers published per
year during each of two successive five—year periods was
collected for 40 research scientists ranging in age from their
30's to their 60's. Subjects' curriculum vitae were the source
of the publication information. Productivity was steady for
those aged 30 to 39 at the end of the first five—year period,
grew slightly for those aged 40 to 49, and fell off for those
aged 50 or greater.
Number of patent memoranda, number of patent applications and
number of patents issued were used as measures of productivity.
Altogether 962 man—years worth of data for 89 men in one
division of a large industrial scientific research organiza-
tion were collected. Each of these 962 man—years was treated
was treated as a separate observation in a cross—sectional
analysis. All three patent variables were positively corre-
lated with length of service; however, the positive associa-
tion between patent activity and length of service was much
weaker beyond 10 years of service than prior to that cutoff.
Supervisors were asked to complete a performance evaluation
of each of their subordinates, rating them on "overall
effectiveness," which was not explicitly defined. A signif i—
cant negative correlation was found between these ratings and
individual employees' length of service. The supervisors'
ratings were also negatively correlated with salary.AS
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Federal mail Production records covering an eight—weekperiod for approxi— sorters (Bureau mately 6,000 workers in twelve cities were analyzed.An index of Labor of performance was computed for each workerby dividing his/her Statistics
production score by the average production score of allworkers [1964)). aged 35 to 44 doing similar work in the samecity. Those with
less than six months service had the lowestaverage performance
index; beyond six months, length of service seemedto be unim-
portant.
Scientists and Five measures of current performancewere collected for a engineers in cross—section of 1,311 scientists and engineersworking in 11 research research laboratories: (1) contribution toscientific knowl— laboratories edge, as judged by colleagues; (2) overall usefulnessto (Pelz [1964)). laboratory, again as judged by colleagues; (3)published
papers; (4) patent applications; and (5) unpublishedpapers.
All the performance measures were for thefive—year period
prior to the date of the study. For those in researchlabora-
tories, measured performance typically was highestamong those
aged 35—44 as of the time of the study; for those indevelop-
ment laboratories, the peak occurredamong those 45 to 49.
Performance among those immediately beyond thepeak age group
was sharply lower. A second peak in performancewas evident
10 to 15 years beyond the firstperformance peak.
Office workers Data on physical volume of productionper hour worked over an doing routine work observation period of 4 to 12 weeks was collectedfor approxi— such as typing, mately 6,000 workers in 5 federal agencies and 21private filing, posting, companies. An index of performance was computed foreach sorting and card worker by taking the ratio of his/heroutput to the average
punching (Bureau output of those aged 35 to 44 employed at the same firm
of Labor and doing comparable work. Among workers with9 months or Statistics [1960]). more experience on the job, there waspractically no differ-
ence in the mean value of the performance indexacross age
groups, either within occupational groups or when anaverage was taken across the occupational groups. Alarge proportion
of those included in the sample were underincentive payment
schemes. However, the results lookedvery similar for those
under incentive and those under timepayment plans.A6
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Technical employees Performance of approximately 900 technical employees in one
in a large research firm was estimated using cross—sectional data on individuals'
and engineering positions in the annual order—of—merit rankings of technical
firm (Oberg [1960)). employees. These rankings were done on a department by department
basis for salary administration purposes. The criterion used
in ranking was the workers' "present value to the company."
This criterion was not defined more precisely. Among those
doing research and development work, performance was highest
for those 30 to 35 and fell off gradually thereafter. Among
those doing engineering work, performance fell off for those
aged 32 through SO, then showed a second peak for those in
their 50's.
Retail sales The dollar volume of sales for clerks in two large department
personnel stores were used to form performance ratings of 1 through 4,
(Canadian depending on each individuals' quartile position in the dis—
Department of tribution of dollar sales for his/her department. At one
Labor [1959]). store, mean rated performance was lower for those with less
than 3 years' service than for those in the longer service
groups, and weakly but positively related toservice there-
after. At the second store, mean rated performance was lower
for those with less than 6 years' service than for those with
more service and again weakly but positively related to service
thereafter.
Production workers For approximately 5,100 workers in 15 footwear establishments
in the wood and 11 furniture establishments, output per worker—hour was
household furniture measured using average straight time hourly piecework earnings.
industry and the The production index used for comparison purposes was each
footwear industry individual's average hourly earnings divided by the mean of
(Bureau of Labor average hourly earnings for those of the same sexin the
Statistics [1957]). 35 to 44 age group doing the same job in the same plant. In
both industries and for both sexes, the meanvalue of the
productionindex was highest for those aged 25 to 34 and fell
beyond that age group.
Production workers Piecework earnings data for 933 workers in the footwear industry
in the footwear and 1,284 workers in the clothing industry were studied. The
industry and the data were used to create a production index like that used in
clothing industry Bureau of Labor Statistics (1957), The mean value of this pro—
(Bureau of Labor duction index was stable for all age groups through age 54 and
Statistics (1956]). approximately 10 percent lower for those aged 55 to 64.A7
SUMMARY OF STUDIES PERTAINING TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF TENURE,
EXPERIENCE AND AGE TO PRODUCTIVITY
(continued)
Subject Group Methodology and Conclusions
and Study
Outstanding people The goal of this study was to identify the age by which numerous
in a variety of individuals in various fields had done their best work or
professional achieved their highest average rate of productivity. In the
occupations majority of occupations, it was found that the individuals'
(Lehman [1953]). best work had been done by age 40. However, it should be
emphasized that the study focused on selected outstanding
individuals rather than on a representative sampling of members
of any occupation.
Shopcraft railroad Relative speed of work for a cross—section of 701 employees of
employees (Mater one railroad was used as a measure of worker efficiency.
[1941]). Holding age constant, efficiency appeared to peak at about
10 years of service and fall thereafter.
Employees of large Records on productivity of workers at six companies were
NewEngland broken downinto a comparison of productivity by age
manufacturing groups for 172 textile weavers, 127 textile spinners and
companies 147 workers in nonferrous metal manufacturing. The records
(Palmerand didnot show anytendencyfor productivity to vary with age.
Brownell[1939]).
a5 summary includes all the studies we know of from which inferences can be drawn
concerning the relationship between individuals' age or experience and their pro-
ductivity. For the sake of keeping the list of manageable size, we have excluded
studies which related mean group age or experience to group output. However, the
conclusions of the studies based on group data do not seem to differ much from the
conclusions of those based on individual data.A8
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